Follow-Up Critique: Addressing Unexamined Assumptions in the “Wrong Way” Study

Follow-Up Critique: Addressing Unexamined Assumptions in the "Wrong Way" Study

The Study’s Oversight: Timing as a Fundamental Variable in Adaptability

In my initial evaluation of the study on movement variability in hitting, I pointed out that its design presented a false dichotomy by comparing only two structured training conditions—a “right way” group and a “wrong way” group—without including a control group of any kind. This omission made it impossible to determine whether movement variability itself was responsible for adaptability gains. This binary cause-effect framing excludes multiple factors that could have contributed to the observed improvements.

While that critique focused on the study’s structural limitations, this follow-up shifts to a deeper issue: the flaws in how the study evaluated adaptability and the reasoning behind its conclusions. The study’s framework not only lacked a proper control, but it also failed to account for critical variables that influence adaptability, leading to interpretations that may not hold up under closer scrutiny.

This article will examine:

1. How the study’s evaluation process overlooked key distinctions between mechanical and timing-based adaptations.
2. Why its conclusions about plate discipline and affordance perception misrepresent real-world hitting strategy.
3. The flawed assumption that weight shift dictates timing, despite evidence that elite hitters use diverse timing strategies.

By breaking down these methodological errors, this article will illustrate how the study’s conclusions were shaped by an incomplete framework, rather than an accurate reflection of hitting adaptability. To fully evaluate the study’s claims, a simple but effective test could have been implemented within the existing framework—one that applies controlled conditions to determine whether movement variability alone improves adaptability or if other factors, such as timing adjustments, were responsible for the observed results. This is not meant to be a replacement for a well-structured study with a control group, but rather a way to directly test the study’s conclusions under conditions that isolate key variables.

A Proper Test: The Alternative Testing Model

To truly determine whether mechanical variability alone improves adaptability, a properly controlled experiment within the experiment could have separated movement variability from timing flexibility. This would have been achieved using a batting tee-based experiment, which removes the timed interception constraint of a moving pitch, allowing for an evaluation of swing adaptability independent of intersection constraints and predictions.

A ball on a tee represents a frozen moment in time—a fixed, perfectly timed contact point. With a moving pitch, a hitter must time their swing to intercept the ball, but with a tee, decision timing is eliminated, allowing for a controlled evaluation of adaptability. One group maintains a constant physical relationship to the ball while making mechanical adjustments, while the other group is allowed to modify contact depth—adjusting where they intercept the ball in their swing path without changing their fundamental swing mechanics. In other words, they are constrained to using the same swings they were coached to take during Phase One testing but allowing for shifts in proximity to the ball to create different batted ball outcomes.

Experimental Design: Removing the Timing Constraint

To directly test the study’s conclusions, this experiment isolates movement variability from timing adjustments. Before introducing test conditions, both groups establish a mechanical baseline by identifying their initial proximity to the tee in the same manner, ensuring all hitters can consistently produce line drives.

- Group 1: Timing Variability Allowed (Original “Right Way” Group) Hitters maintain their trained swing but can adjust their stance, spacing, or proximity to the ball to modify contact depth. This mirrors how hitters time moving pitches by intercepting them at different points in their swing path. If this group outperforms Group 2, it suggests that timing adjustments are the dominant factor in adaptability.
- Group 2: Movement Variability, Timing Fixed (Original “Wrong Way” Group) Hitters maintain a fixed stance relative to the ball on a tee. Their only means of improving SLG% is through mechanical adjustments (e.g., bat path, attack angle). If SLG% improves, it suggests mechanical exploration alone enhances performance.

What This Tests

1. If timing adjustments drive adaptability If Group 1 shows greater improvement than Group 2, it suggests that timing flexibility is the real driver of success. If both groups improve equally, it suggests adaptability is a combination of mechanics and timing.
2. If movement variability alone improves adaptability If Group 2 sees no improvement, it suggests mechanical changes alone are insufficient. If they do improve, it supports the idea that hitters can refine their swing independent of timing.

Since the original study did not control for this, improvements in the “wrong way” group could have resulted from timing flexibility rather than mechanical adaptability. Without isolating this variable, the study cannot conclusively determine that movement variability was the primary driver of performance gains.

Key Takeaway: Why This Model is Necessary

This experiment eliminates the timed intersection constraint of a pitched ball, meaning any improvements in SLG% can be explicitly attributed to either movement solutions (mechanics) or timing adjustments (contact depth).

The original study did not control for this, meaning the observed adaptability improvements may have been a function of timing flexibility rather than movement variability alone. The “wrong way” group had greater freedom to adjust timing, making it impossible to conclude that mechanical variability was the primary driver of their improvement.

Had movement variability been tested while holding timing constant, it would be possible to determine whether mechanics alone improve adaptability or if timing adjustments are the real cause of improved outcomes.

This is a separate consideration from the VR-based ecological validity issue—it specifically addresses how the study design fails to isolate the variable it claims to measure.

Misinterpreting Plate Discipline and Affordance Perception

Another issue in the study is its interpretation of plate discipline and affordance perception. The study assumes that a reduced swing rate on inside pitches against a defensive shift indicates improved decision-making. However, this does not align with real-world hitting strategy or pitcher tendencies.

When defenses shift to the pull side, pitchers generally avoid throwing inside to pull-heavy hitters. Instead, they attack the outer half of the plate with fastballs and off-speed pitches designed to induce weak contact. The reason is simple: an inside pitch allows a pull hitter to meet the ball farther forward, making it easier to elevate and drive it over the shift.

This is precisely why hitters such as Ted Williams and Ken Griffey Jr. sought inside pitches when facing a shift—they understood that pulling an outside pitch, even at extreme exit velocities, usually lead to ground-ball outs, not success.

StatCast Data Confirms the Problem

StatCast tracking data on MLB hitters reveals that the 10 hardest-hit balls in modern tracking history were all pulled ground balls on outside pitches.

- 8 of the 10 resulted in outs, including 3 double plays.
- Despite exit velocities between 118.3 mph and 122.4 mph, the batting average was .200, and the OPS was .200—all hits were singles.
- This is exactly what shifting defenses are designed to exploit.

Avoiding Inside Pitches ≠ Better Decision-Making

If the hitters in the experimental group avoided inside pitches, this does not indicate that they developed better affordance perception—it likely means they were passive, untrained, or misinterpreting their best opportunity.

If the same hitters were placed in a batting tee scenario with an inside pitch, they would easily elevate the ball over the shift without modifying their swing mechanics at all—this is a spatial orientation solution, not a movement solution.

This raises key questions:

- Did the wrong way group recognize the best pitches to attack, or did they simply become more passive?
- Were they refining their swing decisions, or avoiding difficult but optimal pitches?
- Was their reduced swing rate on inside pitches an intelligent adjustment, or a sign of hesitation?

The study assumes that plate discipline is defined by swinging less, but this ignores the reality of offensive strategy.

This follows a circular reasoning pattern:

- Premise: Plate discipline means swinging less at “difficult” pitches.
- Observation: The wrong way group swung less at inside pitches.
- Conclusion: The wrong way group showed improved plate discipline.

What’s missing is the recognition that inside pitches were actually the best pitches to attack when a pull side shift is deployed. The hitters who avoided them weren’t demonstrating intelligence—they were either passive, undertrained, or misinterpreting their best opportunity.

The Study’s Misguided Assumption About Weight Shift and Timing

The study also assumes that timing is dictated by weight shift, treating backward and forward movement as a sum that must match pitch arrival time. However, timing in hitting is an interceptive event, not a weight-shift balancing act.

- Not all hitters use a backward-to-forward weight shift for timing.
- Many high-level hitters rely on preset weight distribution rather than a shifting mechanism.
- The stride is often an expansion of the base, initiated pre-pitch release—designed to trigger swing preparation and engage ground reaction forces (GRF) without disrupting force angles. This widening is necessary to accommodate the inversion of weight distribution during rotation, ensuring balance and stability rather than serving as a simple forward weight shift.

If a hitter eliminates backward weight shift variability, the study’s framework collapses because it fails to account for hitters who time through visual cues, barrel acceleration, or spatial adjustments.

Additionally, not all hitters sync front foot strike with swing launch:

- Some hitters land their front foot at or just after pitch release.
- Others “float” their foot strike to coincide with the launch of their swing.

The study assumes a one-size-fits-all timing mechanism rather than recognizing the diverse strategies used by elite hitters.

Conclusion: The Study’s Framework is Incomplete

The study contains critical errors:

1. It did not account for the role of timing in swing adaptability.
2. It misinterpreted plate discipline by rewarding passivity instead of strategic optimization.

Without isolating timing from movement variability, the study’s conclusions remain incomplete and unreliable. A properly controlled test, like the Alternative Testing Model, is necessary to determine whether movement variability alone improves adaptability. Furthermore, the study’s evaluation process introduced additional issues—most notably, misinterpreting plate discipline by rewarding passivity instead of strategic optimization. This flawed assessment framework undermines the validity of its findings, making it impossible to draw meaningful conclusions about hitting adaptability.

Until such a study is conducted with proper controls and an improved evaluation process, the conclusions drawn remain speculative at best and risk perpetuating incorrect assumptions about hitting adaptability.

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